Sweden has a high degree of separatioti of ownership from control through pyramids, dualclass shares, and cross holdings. This increases the potetitia! for private benefits of control. However. Sweden's extralegal institutions--tax tompliatice and newspaper circulation-are consistent with greater shareholder protection. Using data on Swedish mergers we find limited evidence of shareholder expropriation. Apparently, Sweden's extralegal institutions offset the drawback of weak cotporate governance.
I. Introduction
Recent financial research has examined the importance of corporate ownership structure (LaPorta, et. al. (1999) ), legal origins (LaPorta, et. al. (2000) ), and extra-legal institutions (Dyck and Zingales (2001) ) on the private benefits of control and protection of minority shareholders. Pyramids, cross-holdings, and dual class shares separate ownership from control increasing the potential for private benefits of control (Bebchuk et al (2000) ).
Better legal protection and stronger social norms improve minority shareholders' protection from expropriation and consequently reduce the private benefits of control.
Therefore, the overall impact of differing corporate ownership structures, legal systems and social norms on the private benefits of control becomes an empirical question. In this paper we examine Swedish mergers to shed light on these issues.
Sweden provides an advantageous venue to explore these countervailing forces. In LaPorta, et. al.'s (1999) examination of 27 of the riches countries in the world on measures of corporate governance, Sweden performs very badly. It ranks #1 in the use of dual class shares, #2 after Belgium in frequency of pyramids, and #3 after Germany and Austria in the frequency of cross-shareholdings. Sweden on average requires the least capital (12.6%) to control (20%) of the votes. Overall, Sweden appears to be the country where separation of votes from capital is most prevalent. LaPorta, et. al. (2000) rate a number of common legal systems based upon investor protections. Sweden's (Scandinavian) civil law legal system is at the world average, ranking below common law countries but above the French and German civil law. Therefore, Sweden's legal origins wouldn't be expected to offset the weak corporate governance system. However, Coffee (2001) and Dyck and Zingales (2001) point out that possibly equally important for investor protection are extra-legal institutions such as product markets, organized labor, the press, tax compliance, and social norms. Sweden ranks very high based upon these measures.
Empirical studies that attempt to measure the private benefits of control usually use estimates of a control premium, reduction in firm value or find specific examples of shareholder expropriation. Studies that make use of control premiums (Coffee (2001) , Dyck and Zingales (2001) and Nenova (2002) ) generally support the hypothesis that Sweden's extra-legal institutions reduce the private benefits of control despite weak corporate governance. For example, Dyck and Zingales (2001) construct a measure of the value of control based on control transactions. They document that after controlling for tax compliance and newspaper circulation, the only legal origin, which affect the value of control is the Scandinavian tradition, which is negatively related to the value of control. Nenova (2002) measures the value of control as a function of the price difference between voting and non (low) vote stock and finds the average size of the controlling shareholders' private benefits as percentage of a firm's market capitalization is only 1% in Sweden, compared to an average of 4.5% for Common Law countries. Complementing these results, Claessens, et. al. (2000) examine East Asian companies and find the separation of ownership from control through dual-class shares, pyramiding and crossholdings is associated with lower market values. 1 There is a growing literature on instances of minority shareholder expropriation in countries with weak corporate governance and a lack of strong legal or extra-legal 1 Claessens, et. al. (2000) have documented that the separation of ownership from control is quit common in East Asian Corporations. institutions. Specific means of minority shareholder expropriation in countries with weak protection include tunneling, diversification, and bailing out weak affiliates.
Tunneling occurs when someone transfers wealth from a company where he has low cash flow rights to another company where he has higher cash flow rights (Johnson, et. al. (1999) ). Bae et al (2002) find that wealth is transferred/ tunneled to the majority shareholders within Korean chaebol by means of mergers to bail out troubled group members. Betrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2000) document tunneling within Indian pyramids. Related to tunneling, Bigelli and Mengoli (1999) investigate intra-pyramid Italian merger activity and find that wealth is transferred to the controlling shareholder by adjustments to the premium paid for the target.
2 Claessens, et. al. (1998 Claessens, et. al. ( , rather 2000 Claessens, et. al. ( or 2002 ? See reference list) find a positive impact of diversification within industrial groups for their sample of East Asian companies, while in contrast, Lins and Servaes (2002) show that diversifying mergers within industrial groups reduces the wealth of minority shareholders in their sample of firms from seven emerging markets.
Summarizing these results. First, there is evidence that countries with weak corporate governance and extra-legal protection have high control premiums and lower market values. Second, countries with weak corporate governance but stronger extralegal protection have low control premiums. Third, consistent with the high control premiums and lower market value group there are specific examples of minority shareholder expropriation in some of these countries. Given these results, the question naturally arises whether shareholder expropriation is less prevalent in countries such as 2 Higher premiums for control are usually associated with higher levels of minority shareholders abuse. Nenova documents that the value of control is about 30% in both Italy and South Korea. India is not included in her study. Dyck and Zingales (2001) document a mean (median) block premium of 6% (2%) in Sweden, 37% (16%) in Italy, and 16% (17%) in South Korea.
Sweden, with weak governance but strong extra-legal protection. The main contribution of our study is filling this void.
To investigate whether the separation of ownership from control (weak corporate governance) results in minority shareholder expropriation, we distinguish mergers where there is an insider of the bidder that simultaneously owns bidder and target shares (henceforth dual owners). In our sample for the overwhelming majority of cases where we find one investor controlling the bidder and simultaneously owning shares in the target it is through a pyramid structure that use dual class shares and/or cross-holdings.
More specifically, our main results are as follows. First, we document that mergers with dual owners do not on average create any value and there is a transfer of wealth from bidder to target shareholders; but we do not find clear evidence of tunneling through significant wealth transfers from minority shareholders to the dual owners documented in previous studies in countries with weak shareholder protection. The dual owners' gains on their target shares are offset by their losses on their bidder shares.
Second, for mergers where there is a dual owner, the bidders don't acquire any weaker firms than when there isn't a dual owner. Therefore, dual owners don't appear to use mergers as a means to bail out weak members of their industrial groups as found by Bae et. al. (2002) for Korean chaebol.
Third, we find that dual owners are more likely to initiate diversifying mergers, however, it is difficult to believe that these mergers were motivated by the dual owners need to diversify their personal portfolio, since they per definition already hold stock in both the bidder and the target. Therefore, there is no reason to implement a merger that potentially will destroy value (Berger and Ofek (1995) or (1996?) ) unless there are other benefits of control (Lins and Servaes (2002) ). Supporting this suggestion, Lins and Servaes find that diversified companies trade at a discount and that the discount becomes more severe within groups. In contrast, although we find that there is also a diversification discount (negative returns) associated with diversifying mergers, we don't find any additional impact on returns from dual ownership.
Fourth, we find evidence that capital constraints and control are motives for mergers. Firms controlled by the managers are capital constrained since they cannot raise additional equity for new investments without diluting management control. However, a dual owner can reorganize the capital within a pyramid by for example a merger. The mergers with dual ownership motivated by capital constraints typically follow either of two scenarios. In the first scenario, the major shareholder in the target belongs to the pyramid and is capital constrained. The bidder pays cash for the target and the capital constrained firms being the major shareholder in the target receives the cash it needs. In the other version, the capital constrained firm is the bidder and it needs future cash flows.
It acquires a -cash cow‖ or a firm with liquid assets, which it then sells to finance future investment. We find empirical evidence that dual owners overpay for targets with high returns (-cash cow‖). We also find that higher ROA of the target firm is correlated with a diversifying merger. This partly explains our previously mentioned results on diversification. It is likely that a cash cow firm is in a different industry from a firm that is financially constrained.
Finally, we perform additional tests of the importance of control in the year prior to the merger announcement. In these tests, we examine whether dual owners make changes in their voting rights or cash flow rights to increase their control or returns. In related theoretical work, Stulz (1988 Stulz ( or 1990 ?models how target managers may have an incentive to increase voting control through capital structure changes when they are potential takeover targets. We find that when other shareholders are likely to oppose the deal, the dual owners acquire voting shares in the bidder. The dual owners also purchase equity shares of the target prior to the merger announcement. However, the returns for the dual owners on their purchases of target shares are offset by their purchases of bidder votes for control purchases in the year prior to the merger. Since the target shares are exchanged for bidding shares, the purchases of target shares also increases control in the surviving combined firm.
In sum, despite the significant separation of ownership from control in Sweden, rather than a large direct expropriation of minority shareholders found in countries with weaker corporate governance, we find limited evidence of the controlling shareholders abusing other shareholders. Apparently, in Sweden there is a mechanism to protect minority shareholders, possibly extra-legal institutions. Finally, we find that the mergers within the Swedish industrial groups appear to be motivated by the dual owners' control considerations and capital constraints.
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In the next section we describe the Swedish corporate governance model. In section III we describe our data. Then, in section IV we specify our variables and present our empirical results. Finally, in section V we provide a summary.
II. The Swedish Corporate Governance Model and Merger Activity
In Sweden, corporate and securities laws provide a set of rules-which allow dual class shares, pyramids and cross-holdings-that facilitate private ownership for establishing and maintaining control of listed firms. The result is that within the Swedish financial system, ownership groups have often held controlling blocks in affiliated firms and taken an active part in management. These ownership spheres control many firms, especially the largest ones. The spheres usually exercise control through their investment companies (closed end investment funds) organized as pyramidal holding companies. (2000) reports that in 1998 the largest shareholder controlled, on average, 37.7% of the voting rights. The second largest voting stake was 11.2% on average. Thus, the typical firm has a well-defined owner in control and the two largest stakes have close to absolute control. In 34% of the firms the owner in control had more than 50% of the votes. 82.2%
of the firms had a well-defined owner with more than 25% of the votes, which can be argued to be operational control of the firm. 
III. Data Selection and Sample Characteristics
6 Due to a Compulsory Acquisition Limit of 90%, a shareholder controlling at least 10% of the votes can block such a takeover bid. Furthermore, the offers are usually for all outstanding shares because of tax reasons (Agnblad et al (2000) ). 7 It is noteworthy that the ownership data is collected from the public record, made more accessible, and published yearly in a used friendly format by a subsidiary to Sweden's largest daily newspaper.
Until the beginning of the 1980's, Handelsbanken 8 and SE-Banken (Wallenbergs)
held almost total control of the Swedish capital market, which made takeovers hard or impossible to finance without their cooperation (Rydqvist (1992) Rydqvist (1996) ).
In Sweden almost all mergers are preceded by a public tender offer (Bergström and Rydqvist (1989)). We identify tender offers associated with the mergers for companies listed on the SSE (the A-list, the OTC, and the Unofficial list) from 1985 through 1991 from the records of the SSE and from daily newspapers. 9 We identified the mergers occurring during the period 1992-1995 from the Stockholm Stock Exchange Quarterly Report. We only examine those mergers in which both the target and the bidder were listed on the SSE at the time of the merger and the previous year. This process yielded 121 attempted non-partial mergers of which 115 were successful. Of the successful bids, five were revised before they ultimately accepted. There was only one bidder for 111 of the 121 of the mergers in the sample.
The high frequency of uncontested successful bids may also be due to the frequent occurrence of large blockholders. According to Swedish law, a shareholder, or a group of 8 Handelsbanken is controlled by a number of foundations (mainly the Oktogonen Foundation), which in turn are controlled by the managers of the bank (compared to the Wallenberg pyramid where the foundations are controlled by the Wallenberg family). Part of the control over the bank comes through Industrivärden (Closed End Investment Fund), which also is controlled by Oktogonen.
shareholders, with 10% of the shares can block a merger. Therefore, the terms of the tender offer are often negotiated between the bidder and the large shareholders before the public announcement. When the large blockholders have accepted the terms of the bid, a follow-up tender offer is made for all target shares including the blockholders' shares (Rydqvist (1993) ). The fact that most bids were successful suggests that almost all the mergers in our sample are friendly.
Shareholder data were collected from Sundqvist 1985 -1993 , Sundin and Sundqvist 1994 -1995 , and from annual reports for 1984. Sundqvist and Sundin, and
Sundqvist report the holdings of the 25 largest shareholders. Their data is collected from a public record, which includes all shareholders with more than 500 shares. Sundqvist 1985 -1993 and Sundin and Sundqvist 1994 -1995 group the holdings of family members and point out possible partnership and cross ownership. These sources state the ownership in each listed firm as of January. We identified and treated as one entity the following types of dual owners: family members, family controlled firms and family controlled foundations.
We collected stock prices from the Findata TRUST database. We use the market model to calculate abnormal returns (Brown and Warner (1985) ). When the firm has publicly traded A and B shares, we calculated a value-weighted portfolio of these shares
In some of the target firms, the A-shares are not traded since the controlling owner keeps all A-shares when the firm goes public. When this is the case, we add the extra premium paid on the A-shares to the premium on the B shares. 10 Shall we mention anything about the extra premium on A shares (20%) and the frequency (36% of the dual class targets receive a differentiated bid) of differentiated bids (different prices for A and B shares)?
This does not differ between listed and unlisted A shares. The referee also asks how frequent it is that the bidder already controls all A shares in the target -It happens twice in our sample of dual owners. . The combined CAR value is calculated on a valueweighted portfolio of the target and the bidder.
The typical bidder is an old industrial firm, a holding company, or a closed end investment fund. The holding companies and closed end investment funds are structured as two layer pyramids and the targets are then either second layer firms in which they have major shareholdings or firms outside the pyramids in which they have no holdings or only a minority interest. The typical target firm is an industrial firm. The mean market capitalization of bidder firms is four times larger than the mean market capitalization of target firms. Many of the targets (41%) had only been on the SSE for five years or less.
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Major ownership spheres account for 55% of the attempted mergers in our sample. The major control groups are also over represented among the dual owners.
The results we report in Table 1 support our discussion in section II about the Swedish corporate governance model. Panel A shows that for bidders dual class shares (80%) and pyramids (76%) are used more frequently for firms with dual owners. The difference for pyramids is significant at the 5% level. We find similar results (Panel B) for target firms. Panel C shows that bidders with dual class shares are much more likely to be part of a pyramid (83% belong to a pyramid while 60% do not).
10 As an alternative we have rerun all analysis using the premium on the B-shares as a proxy for the premium on the A-shares. It does not change the results. 11 The real percentage of -young‖ targets is even higher since we deleted the observations if both the target and the bidder were not listed on SSE in January the year before the bid.
Descriptive statistics for the 121 mergers are presented in and diversification do not significantly differ between mergers with and without dual owners (Panel C).
IV. Variable Description
This study examines whether the separation of ownership from control resulting from the use of dual class shares, cross-ownership and pyramids gives rise to the expropriation of minority shareholders. Therefore, we construct a variable that simultaneously accounts for ownership of bidder and target shares (brought about by pyramids) and control of the bidder (using dual class shares). Our measure of the marginal impact of dual ownership and control on mergers is a dummy variable INSCONDANDDO = 1 when the bidder's CEO and board members are the largest vote holders of the bidder and also hold shares in the target, and 0 otherwise.
To measure diversification we use DIV, a dummy variable, which is set equal to one if the bidder and target have different two-digit main industry codes, and zero otherwise (Maquiera et al (1995) ).
We also use a number of control variables. First, although Song and Walkling (1993) find that target shareholders returns are positively correlated with managerial ownership for contested offers, they find no significant affect for uncontested offers.
Almost all of our mergers are uncontested. We measure managerial ownership of the target with a dummy variable, INSCONTAR, which equals 1 when the bidder's CEO and board members together hold the largest block of votes in the target and 0 otherwise.
Second, we control for insider ownership of the bidder. Amihud and Lev (1981) and Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985) find that insider ownership leads to higher returns to bidding shareholders. 12 For inside ownership of the bidder we employ a dummy variable, INSCONBID, which equals 1 when the bidder's CEO and board members together hold the largest block of votes in the bidder and 0 otherwise 13 .
To control for other known effects on mergers we include (1) a method of payment dummy (METPAY), which is equal to one if the merger is a pure cash offer, and zero otherwise (Travlos (1988) ), (2) the bidding firm's toehold in the target in January the year of the tender offer (TOEHOLD), (Stulz, Walkling, and Song (1990) ), (3) a relative size variable (LOGRELMVE), which is the logarithm of the target's market 12 Amihud and Lev (1981) have suggested risk reduction as a motive for mergers. The non-diversifiable firm risk exposure for insiders is reduced, increasing the value of their human capital, as the firm diversifies its holdings. At the same time, they show that the firm is more likely to complete a conglomerate merger as insiders hold larger equity stakes, whose value may be decreased. However, Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985) find that as the equity stake of insiders in the bidder increases the returns to the bidding shareholders for risk-reducing mergers increases. However, Loderer and Martin (1997) find no evidence that larger insider equity takes lead to higher returns to bidding shareholders. 13 Although we don't report the results, we have also performed tests using the percentage of insider ownership rather than a dummy variable. The results are similar.
value of equity divided by the bidder's market value of equity, (4) the debt to total assets of the bidder (BIDDEBT), (5) the return on assets of the bidder in the year prior to the merger (BIDROA), and (6) the return on assets of the target in the year prior to the merger (TARROA)
V. Empirical Tests
In this section, we investigate whether Sweden's corporate governance model leads to the expropriation of minority shareholders, as opposed to an alternative hypothesis that Swedish extra-legal institutions provide protection for minority shareholders, despite weak corporate governance. To test for expropriation, we look at target returns, bidder returns, combined bidder and target returns, tunneling, bailing out weak firms, and diversification. We also explore two alternative reasons for mergers:
capital constraints and solidifying control.
A. Bidder Returns, Target Returns, Weighted Returns and Tunneling
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that inside ownership of equity will align the interest of insiders and outside shareholders. For mergers this implies that higher insider ownership in the bidder and targets should lead to higher returns to the bidder and target, respectively. However, since dual owners are concerned with the overall impact upon their wealth as a result of a merger, rather than with any individual source of wealth, the effects of insider ownership is unclear. This is especially the case when through pyramids dual owners have the means to tunnel returns to themselves.
Bidder Returns
As shown in Table 3 Panel A, the bidder shareholders make insignificant returns for any particular trading window around the announcement. These results are consistent with other studies. 14 In Panel B, we split the sample by whether there is a dual owner.
When the bidding insiders also hold shares in the target, the returns to bidding shareholders are negative and significant. However, when no dual owner is present, there is some weak evidence that bidder shareholders gain (median CAR positive and significant at the 10% level). The difference between the two sub samples is significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with Bae, et. al. (2002) .
Our cross-sectional regression results reported in Table 4 Of course, since dual owners have bidder shares themselves, they are reducing their own wealth. An interesting question, which we will address later, is whether they receive some other private benefits of control to mitigate this cost.
Insider ownership in the target (INSCONTAR) has no effect on the distribution of merger gains. The method of payment variable, the diversification variable (negative) and significant), and the toehold variable (insignificant) are generally consistent with U.S.
studies by Travlos (1988), Maquiera et al (1995) , and Stulz et al (1990) .
Target Returns
Through dual class shares and pyramids, duals owners may offset losses from their bidder shares by having the bidding firm overpay for the target shares of the dual owner. In Table 3 Panel B the 11-day CARs are sorted by the existence of a dual owner.
The means and medians show that there is no significant difference in target share returns when the merger includes a dual owner. Our cross-sectional results reported in Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 Panel B also indicate no explanatory power for insider or dual ownership.
Value Weighted Returns
Before we test whether dual owners profit through tunneling we consider whether the mergers increase the combined value of the bidder and target. As shown in Table 3 Panel A the value weighted portfolios of bidder and target shares make significant positive returns for all of the trading intervals we considered around the announcement date. In Panel B, the total net wealth effect of mergers where the insiders in the bidder hold equity in both the bidder and the target is insignificantly different from zero. Thus, the market expects no positive synergies from these mergers. However, the difference in returns between when there is dual owner and when there is not is significant for differences in median returns but insignificant for mean returns. In Table 4 Panel C, dual ownership has a negative impact on value-weighted returns in model 2 (5 % significance).
14 Similar to the extant empirical takeover literature (e.g. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) ) our further analysis is based on an eleven-day window interval around the announcement of the merger (days -5 to +5), to capture pre-announcement leakage effects as well as post-announcement corrections.
For our results on target, bidder, and weighted returns we have not accounted for diversification. As we shall see in our results reported later in this paper, diversification is an important control variable.
Tunneling
In the context of our study, tunneling involves the transfer of returns from a firm where the dual owner has low ownership to a firm where he has higher ownership. A simple example illustrates our point. Assume a merger of firms with dual class shares where an individual owns 51% of the vote and cash flow rights of the bidder and 100% of the vote and cash flow rights of the target. If the dual owner through his control of the bidder overpays for the target, the dual owner will garner 100% of the overpayment while only paying for 51% of it. This is a clear transfer of wealth from other bidder shareholders to the dual owner. Now assume that the dual owner has 51% of the votes and 0% of the cash flow rights. In this case, there is an even greater transfer of wealth to the dual owner from bidder shareholders than the previous example. Finally, assume the dual owner obtains her 51% vote in the bidder indirectly through a multi-level pyramid structure and cross-ownership. This additional separation of ownership from control allows an even smaller investment on the part of the dual owner to obtain the transfer of wealth to his 100% ownership of target shares.
For our tests of tunneling we examine all of the dual owners' stockholdings on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE). If the dual owner gains on his total stock holdings despite losses on his bidder shares, this would be evidence of tunneling. In Table 5 Panel A we report the returns for dual owners on their (1) bidder shares, (2) bidder and target shares, (3) other stock holdings on SSE (does not include target and bidder shares), and (4) total holdings on SSE. For (2), (3), and (4), the returnshave been adjusted for indirect ownership through pyramids. . There is no evidence of tunneling on the part of the dual owner: the returns for the dual owner on (2), (3) and (4) are insignificantly different from zero. However, as shown in the difference tests (1)- (2), (1)- (3), and (1)- (4), the dual owner does significantly better than the bidder shareholders (Delete the (2) - (3) 
C. Diversification
In the previous section we found that dual owners lost on their bidder shares, gained on their target shares and broke even overall. Therefore, one would expect another reason for the mergers implemented by the dual owners. As we explained earlier, diversification shouldn't be a motivation for the mergers either since the dual owners are already diversified through their holdings prior to the merger. Nevertheless, our analysis of diversification will set the stage for the following sections where we show that diversification is correlated with other motivations for dual owners. First, we are interested in whether dual owners are more likely to conduct diversifying mergers.
Second, we check whether dual ownership impacts the returns associated with diversification.
In Table 6 , we show that INSCONBID is negatively but not significantly associated with diversifying mergers. This is consistent with previous studies of insider ownership and diversification (Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997)). However, we find some weak evidence of agency problems associated with dual ownership. There is a positive and significant relationship (10% level) between DIV and INSCONBIDANDDO (Model 2). Two of our control variables that have been associated with diversification, BIDDEBT and BIDROA (Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) and Berger and Ofek (1995) (1996?)) are insignificant. However, TOEHOLD is positive and significant at the 10% level indicating that bidding firms that have already partially diversified themselves through a toehold are more likely to complete a diversifying merger.
Panel B Model 2 reports a negative and significant relationship between bidder
CARs and diversification. However, the sign on DIV*INSCONBIDDO is insignificant.
This indicates that although diversification hurts bidders, when dual owners diversify it is no more costly to bidders than for non-dual owners. These results are in contrast to Lins We perform regression analysis as additional tests of the capital constraint and control hypothesis. In Table 7 Panel B Model 1, we show that TARGETROA has a negative and significant relationship with bidder CARs. Interestingly, in Model 2 when we include INSCONBIDANDDO*TARGETROA, TARGETROA is insignificant but INSCONBIDANDDO*TARGETROA is negative and significant. This implies that dual owners over pay for high ROA targets, but in general firms don't overpay.
Further analysis of target ROA gives insight into why dual owners implement diversifying mergers. In Table 7 Panel C Model 1 we show that TARGETROA is positively and significantly related to DIV. This helps to explain why dual owners make diversifying mergers. Diversifying mergers appear to be a byproduct of obtaining high ROA targets. It is sensible that if a bidder is capital constrained, it is more likely to find a cash cow in another industry. However, when we include the interaction term INSCONBIDANDDO*TARGETROA in model 2 we find that INSCONBIDANDDO is also positive and significant. Apparently there are additional private benefits to control for diversifying mergers not explained by the target's ROA.
E. Additional Control Tests
In this section we investigate what steps dual owners take prior to a merger to solidify control of the bidder when they attempt to implement a merger with high agency costs. There is a large body of evidence indicating that target shareholders earn high returns from mergers (Jensen and Ruback (1983)), therefore, we also look at purchases of target vote and capital.
Univariate statistics on the changes in vote and capital in bidding and target shares by the dual owner and the bidding firm toehold are reported in Table 8 . Panels A suggests that the dual owners on average don't increase their ownership in the bidder the year before the merger. Furthermore, in Panel B there is strong evidence of the accumulation of target shares the year before the tender offer.
Returning to the question of whether dual owners directly profit from their shareholdings in the bidder and target, we compare the gains the dual owners made on their actual portfolios of bidder and target shares to the gains that they would have made had they kept the portfolios they held one year prior to the merger announcement (we call these portfolios their implicit portfolios). As Panel D shows, the dual owners' actual portfolio performance didn't significantly differ from the implicit portfolio. Apparently, the gains they make on their purchases of target shares are offset by the losses on the bidder shares. There is also weak evidence of increased toeholds by the bidder in the year prior to the merger. However, these statistics do not condition on the dual owners' initial holdings in the bidder and target, respectively, or whether other shareholders are likely to object to the merger-when the mergers are motivated by the dual owner's desire to overcome capital constraints without losing control by acquiring a cash rich target in another industry. We turn to these issues below.
We expect that it is more likely that dual owners will increase their votes in the bidder when they are planning a diversifying merger and when they don't already have solid control of the bidder. As expected, we show in Table 9 that DIV has a significant and positive impact on BIDVOTE (change in vote of the dual owner the year prior to the merger). Also, there is a significant positive relationship with INSOWNTAR (the fraction of insider ownership in the target). This is consistent with the expectation that target insiders will demand a higher return as their ownership increases. The dual owner needs to increase his control of the bidder in order to pay the higher premium for the target over the objection of other bidder shareholders. These results provide some support for the hypothesis that the dual owners control considerations lead to accumulation of votes prior to a merger.
Although, a dual owner can't always be sure whether other shareholders will object to his intentions, when the dual owner doesn't already control the bidder, we expect him to obtain additional voting shares before he announces his intentions to other bidder shareholders. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find a negative relationship between BIDVOTE and DOBIDVOTEYEAR-1 (dual owners votes one year prior to the merger announcement). This evidence supports the hypothesis that dual owners reinforce their control when they don't already control the bidder.
Finally, we check whether RELSIZE, related to the potential costs of gaining control of the bidder or target, impacts the dual owners decision. The coefficient is not significant.
V. Summary
In this paper we test whether extra legal institutions hinder controlling shareholders' expropriation of minorities when they have amble opportunities to do so. In particular we look at Swedish firms that have pyramid structures and dual class shares. As a result of this corporate ownership structure, there are many mergers where a manager in the bidder owns shares in both the bidder and target. Consistent with expropriation of minorities, the existence of these dual shareholders decrease bidder returns, increase target returns and the probability of diversifying mergers. In addition, dual owners carry out mergers without any positive synergies. However, our results do not indicate direct transfers (tunneling) of wealth from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders (dual owners). Since the dual owners do not make pecuniary gains the mergers must be motivated by other objectives. Our results suggest that the mergers might be motivated by firms within the dual owners' pyramid being capital constrained and additional equity capital cannot be raised without the dual owner diluting his control of the firm. The dual owner therefore initiates mergers in order to reorganize the cash flow within the pyramid.
We conclude that the extra legal institutions in Sweden (social norms, the press, and tax compliance) appear to discourage clear violations of minorities, e.g. through tunneling. 
Table 1 Frequency of Dual Class Shares and Pyramids for Bidder and Target Firms
The sample used in this study consists of Swedish Tender Offers 1985-1995 where both the bidder and the target were listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (the A-list, the OTC list or the Unofficial list) at the time of the announcement. This table reports the frequency of dual class shares and pyramids for bidder and target firms for our sample, respectively. If the insiders in the bidder control the bidder (largest shareholder) and at the same time hold shares in the target, it is defined as a dual insider ownership. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Mergers Sorted by the Existence of a Dual Owner
The sample used in this study consists of Swedish Mergers 1985-1995 where both the bidder and the target were listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (the A-list, the OTC list or the Unofficial list) at the time of the announcement. If the insiders in the bidder control the bidder (largest vote holder) and at the same time hold shares in the target, it is defined as a dual insider ownership. Return on Total Assets (ROA) is defined as Earnings before Interest, Taxes, and Depreciation (EBITD) divided by Total Assets (TA). Total Assets (TA) = Market Value of Equity (MVE) plus Book Value of Debt (BVD) averaged over the year, i.e. (TA beginning of year plus TA end of year)/2. Return on equity (ROE) is defined as EBITD divided by MVE. MVE is averaged over the year, i.e. (MVE beginning of year plus MVE end of year)/2. Approximate q defined as (MVE+BVD)/Book Value of Total Assets. Ownership by board members and the CEO are defined as insider ownership (INSOWN) . Toehold is the bidding firms holdings in the target in January the year of the tender offer. If the offer was a pure cash offer it is defined as being cash financed. Relative Size is defined as the target's sales and MVE, respectively, divided by the bidder's sales and MVE, respectively. If the two-digit main industry code of the target is not the same as the bidder's two-digit main industry code, the acquisition is defined as diversifying. Significance of median differences is tested by Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Proportions tests are based on sign tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. N=121. 
Table 3 Daily and Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Tender Offer Announcements
In this table we report daily (ARs) and cumulative (CARs) abnormal returns for various windows around the tender offer announcements for bidder and target shareholders, and for a value weighted portfolio of bidder and target shares. Residuals are computed from the market model prediction errors, z-statistics are computed and reported in parenthesis. Median significance tested by Wilcoxon sign-rank test. Median differences tested by Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The sample used in this study consists of Swedish Tender Offers 1985-1995 where both the bidder and the target were listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (the A-list, the OTC list or the Unofficial list) at the time of the announcement. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Day 0 is the first tender offer announcement on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. N=121 The sample used in this study consists of Swedish Mergers 1985-1995 where both the bidder and the target were listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (the A-list, the OTC list or the Unofficial list) at the time of the announcement. The 11-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are computed from the market model prediction errors. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. N=121. INSCONBID = one if the bidder's CEO and board members control the bidder (largest vote holder), and zero otherwise. INSCONBIDISDO = one if the bidder's CEO and board members control (largest vote holder) the bidder and also hold shares in the target, and zero otherwise. DIV = one if the two-digit main industry code of the target firm is not the same as the bidding firm's two-digit main industry code, and zero otherwise. TARGETCEOSTAYS = one if the target CEO stays as manager in the merged firm, and zero otherwise. INSCONTAR = one if the target's CEO and board members control (largest vote holder) the target, and zero otherwise. METPAY = one if it is a pure cash offer, and zero otherwise. LOGRELMVE = the target's market value of equity divided by the bidder's market value of equity and then transformed into its logarithmic form. TOEHOLD = the bidder's holdings in the target in January the year of the tender offer. Table 5 Tunneling: The Dual Insider Returns at the Tender Offer Announcements
In this table we report cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the observations where the insiders in the bidder control the bidder (largest shareholder) and at the same time hold shares in the target. In panel A and B we report results for the 11-day window around the tender offer announcements for (1) bidder shareholders, (2) for the dual insider's portfolio of bidder and target shares, (3) for the dual insider's portfolio of other SSE holdings (excluding her bidder and target shares), and (4) for the dual owner's total SSE portfolio. Residuals are computed from the market model prediction errors, z-statistics are computed and reported in parenthesis. In panel C we report a two-by-two table with target's CARs sorted by whether there was a dual insider and whether the target did not belong to a pyramid/ was in the first layer in the pyramid. In panel D we report a two-by-two table with bidder's CARs sorted by whether there was a dual insider and the operating performance (Return on Asset) of the target. Median significance tested by Wilcoxon sign-rank test. Median differences tested by Wilcoxon rank-sum test. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Day 0 is the first tender offer announcement on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The sample used in this study consists of Swedish Mergers 1985-1995 where both the bidder and the target were listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (the A-list, the OTC list or the Unofficial list) at the time of the announcement. In Panel A, a logistic regression with Diversification as dependent variable is reported. DIV = one if the two-digit main industry code of the target firm is not the same as the bidding firm's twodigit main industry code, and zero otherwise. Marginal effects are reported with heteroskedasticity robust zstatistics in parenthesis. In Panel B the 11-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are used as dependent variable. CARs are computed from the market model prediction errors. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. N=121. INSCONBID = one if the bidder's CEO and board members control the bidder (largest vote holder), and zero otherwise. INSCONBIDISDO = one if the bidder's CEO and board members control (largest vote holder) the bidder and also hold shares in the target, and zero otherwise. TOEHOLD = the bidder's holdings in the target in January the year of the tender offer. BIDDEBT = the bidder's debt to total asset ratio the year before the acquisition announcement (book values). BIDROA = the bidder's return on assets the year before the acquisition announcement. INSCONTAR = one if the target's CEO and board members control (largest vote holder) the target, and zero otherwise. METPAY = one if it is a pure cash offer, and zero otherwise. LOGRELMVE = the target's market value of equity divided by the bidder's market value of equity and then transformed into its logarithmic form. Owner and the target's operating performance (TARGETROA = the target's return on assets the year before the acquisition announcement) the year before the tender offer announcement is reported. CARs are computed from the market model prediction errors. In Panel B a cross-sectional regression with the Bidder's 11-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as dependent variable is reported. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. In panel C, a logistic regression with Diversification as dependent variable is reported. DIV = one if the two-digit main industry code of the target firm is not the same as the bidding firm's two-digit main industry code, and zero otherwise. Marginal effects are reported with heteroskedasticity robust z-statistics in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. N=117 (4 target ROA not available). INSCONBID = one if the bidder's CEO and board members control the bidder (largest vote holder), and zero otherwise. INSCONBIDISDO = one if the bidder's CEO and board members control (largest vote holder) the bidder and also hold shares in the target, and zero otherwise. TOEHOLD = the bidder's holdings in the target in January the year of the tender offer. BIDDEBT = the bidder's debt to total asset ratio the year before the acquisition announcement (book values). BIDROA = the bidder's return on assets the year before the acquisition announcement. INSCONTAR = one if the target's CEO and board members control (largest vote holder) the target, and zero otherwise. METPAY = one if it is a pure cash offer, and zero otherwise. LOGRELMVE = the target's market value of equity divided by the bidder's market value of equity and then transformed into its logarithmic form. The sample used in this study consists of Swedish Mergers 1985-1995 where both the bidder and the target were listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (the A-list, the OTC list or the Unofficial list) at the time of the announcement. In this table we investigate the trading strategies of the bidder's CEO and board members when they control the bidder (largest vote holder) and also hold shares in the target. The shareholdings of year -1 are from January the year before the announcement. The shareholdings from year 0 are from January the year of the announcement. Trading gains calculated as the difference in 11-day realized announcement returns and the implicit returns (the gains the dual owners made on their actual portfolios of bidder and target shares to the gains that they would have made had they kept the portfolios they held one year prior to the merger announcement) on their year -1 portfolio. Median difference tests are based on Wilcoxon sign-rank test of matched pairs. The sample used in this study consists of Swedish Mergers 1985-1995 where both the bidder and the target were listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (the A-list, the OTC list or the Unofficial list) at the time of the announcement. If an investor holds more than 10% of the votes in the bidder and at the same time holds shares in the target, he is defined as a dual owner. We focus on dual owners with more than 10% of the votes in the bidder since it is assumed that a certain ownership fraction (i.e. board position or equivalent) is needed in order to have information about future mergers. The dependent variables: BIDCAP = the difference in the dual owners' capital ownership fraction in the bidder year 0 and year -1. BIDVOTE = the difference in the dual owners' vote ownership fraction in the bidder year 0 and year -1. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. N=25. The independent variables: DIV = one if the two-digit main industry code of the target firm is not the same as the bidding firm's two-digit main industry code, and zero otherwise. RELSIZM = the target's market value of equity divided by the bidder's market value of equity. INSOWNTAR = the fraction of insider ownership in the target. DOBIDVOTEYEAR-1 = the dual owners' vote fraction in the bidder in January the year before the tender offer. The 11-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns at the tender offer were -4%, +37, and -1% for the bidder, the target, and the value-weighted portfolio, respectively. The Wallenberg sphere's cumulative abnormal returns were +/-0%. Wallenberg's total ownership in Asea was 26.3% of the votes and 22. Controlling stakes (largest vote holder) in Alfa-Laval, Astra, Atlas Copco, Electrolux, Ericsson, Garphyttan Industrier, OM Stockholm, Saab-Scandia, SE Banken, Skandia, SKF, Stora, and Ångpanneföreningen,
Model 1 BIDCAP

